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'Lost innocents and the loss of innocence': interpreting 
adivasi movements in South Asia 
 
 
Crispin Bates 
(Department of History, University of Edinburgh) 
 
 
 
In discussing indigenous peoples movements in South Asia we are concerned with a range 
of movements that may be subsumed under the title of adivasi movements - adivasi being 
a term preferred by the participants in many of the movements themselves.1 Adivasi has 
been adopted in recent years in India for political reasons similar to those found in Africa, 
where the term 'tribal' is no longer used because of its association with white racial 
supremacism and the divide and rule policies of colonial and post-colonial governments. 
Nonetheless this has not prevented the nineteenth century term 'tribal' continuing in use, 
especially amongst anthropologists and ethnographers within India, many of whom 
employ the term both as an an analytical category and simply as a label that can be 
attached to a variety of social and religious movements. In this there would not be any 
harm, but for the fact that many of the prejudices and misconceptions associated with the 
origins of the term have persisted as well. It is arguable that adivasi leaders and 
ideologues are not innocent of this, and that the very form of their identification and the 
trajectory of their political struggle, serves to reinforce rather than contradict the 
prejudices directed against them. The 'indigenous peoples' or adivasi movements in South 
Asia may even depend on such prejudices for their survival. Indeed, it is arguable that 
without such prejudices, recently as well as in the past, the adivasis as a community would 
not exist. The adivasis may thus be regarded as not so much the 'original' inhabitants of 
South Asia, but the very recent creation of colonial anthropology. Paradoxically, they 
might be seen as an invention rather than a victim of modernity.2 
                                     
1 The word 'adivasi' is used in a dual sense in this paper. Firstly the concept as used by contemporary 
writers is deconstructed; secondly I use it myself as a purely descriptive category in the context of a 
discussion of the multiplicity of tribal societies and kingdoms to be found in pre-modern South Asia. 
Tribal kingdoms are the sites and products of political process and are a valid object of historical enquiry. 
However the term 'adivasi', I would argue, has no essential, ontological or analytical value. 
For an outline of the large number of movements, formerly known as 'tribal movements' , with which we 
are concerned in this paper see K.S. Singh (ed.), Tribal Movements in India, vols. 1 & 2, (Delhi: 
Manohar, 1982).   
2 This point has been acknowledged in respect of the worldwide indigenous peoples' movement in the 
report of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (ICIHI). This report admits 
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In India as a whole there are supposedly some 400 different 'tribes' which, depending on 
how you define them, account for more than 50 million of the population, concentrated in 
the centre and north-east of the country - a population now more commonly known not as 
'tribals', but as the 'adivasis'. The Indian term 'adivasi' derives from the Hindi word 'adi ', 
meaning 'beginning' or 'of earliest times', and the word 'vasi ' meaning 'resident of' - the 
Hindi equivalent of the Latin term 'aborigine', meaning 'from the beginning', an 
equivalence that exists not through coincidence, but by design. The epithet was in fact 
invented by political activists in the area of Chotanagpur in the 1930's, an invention 
motivated not so much by the idea of abolishing the concept of the 'tribal' altogether (as 
was later attempted by nationalists in Africa), but rather with the aim of forging a new 
sense of identity among differing 'tribal' peoples - a tactic which has enjoyed considerable 
success, with the term subsequently becoming widely popularised.  
 
It can be seen, however, that there is nothing at all 'indigenous' about the term, nor the 
people which it purports to describe. Indeed, it could be argued that the concept of the 
adivasi is a product of orientalism. Orientalism has not just been a problem in the western 
understanding of non-western societies, but a phenomenon that has deeply affected 
Indians themselves as they have incorporated into their own understanding of Indian 
society the statistical, canonical, materialistic and self-justificatory interpretations 
purveyed by colonial administrations. As a result India, over the generations, has in many 
aspects been re-made in the image invented for it by European colonialists.3 In this the 
adivasi shares with other political movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a 
vital debt to colonial prejudice. However, the consequence has been legitimising myths 
that establish claims to political power, not in terms of kings and shrines and the rituals of 
incorporation, as found in pre-modern adivasi societies, but in terms of very modern 
notions of property and contract, and using the titles, deeds and descriptions of Indian 
society established by British cartographic and socio-economic surveys of the mid 
                                     
there to be an 'overlap' between indigenous peoples and ethnic and minority groups, but argues that 
'indigenous refers to peoples affected by the past 500 years of colonialism', describing them as 'an 
unresolved part of the legacy of colonialism'. Also cited in this report is the definition of the U.N. 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which insists on two further criteria: non-dominance, and 
self-definition. In other words they must still be the victims of colonialism in some shape or form and 
regard themselves principally in the light of this experience if they are to qualify as 'Indigenous Peoples'. 
The significance and ahistoricism of these definitions are far more profound than the authors themselves 
may have imagined. cf. ICIHI, Indigenous Peoples: a global quest for justice, (London: Zed Books, 
1987), pp. 6-9. For a much broader view of the adivasi, rooted in both an historical and anthropological 
understanding of the subject, with which I am much more sympathetic, see K.S. Singh, Tribal Society in 
India: an anthropo-historical perspective, (Delhi: Manohar, 1985). Also the now rather more dated 
account in G.S. Ghurye, The Scheduled Tribes of India, (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1980). 
3 A useful discussion of Edward Said's concept of Orientalism, and how it has affected understanding of 
Indian society is to be found in R. Inden, Imagining India, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1990). 
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nineteenth century.4 Through their repetitive use as instruments of control by colonial 
administrators, these ideas came to have a powerful meaning to the subject populations 
which they affected. And it is from these ideas, and the tempering of 'rights of conquest' 
by 'rights of occupation' in the British legal framework established in India, that we find 
the origin of the concept of the 'original inhabitant', and of the priority of their claims to 
landed property - a crucial constitutive development in the birth of the adivasi. 5 
 
Another important influence on the idea of the adivasi derived from a quite different 
direction: this was the idea of equality. It arose from pre-modern European origins and 
was brought to India, not by colonial administrators directly, but by Protestant evangelical 
missionaries. Merged with concepts of possession and ownership, there evolved under this 
influence a new, contractual notion of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled, 
and new claims to political representation amongst the population - claims that were 
rooted not in status and inherited influence, but in terms of equality and natural right. 
 
Such claims issued forth in a number of forms in the later nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. One expression lay in the eruption of a variety of Muslim, Sikh and Hindu 
reform movements, anxious to revise and update their respective religions in order to 
meet, and in the light of, the challenge from the West. Amongst them were a number of 
low-caste, anti-Brahmin movements, which aimed to restructure Hinduism by abolishing 
the hierarchies of caste.6 Later on, these movements often found a political voice during 
the nationalist upsurge of the inter-war years.7 More recently still, the same demand for 
political representation has been expressed by groups that were on the margins of social 
and political agitations during the colonial period. Asserting rights to property and a share 
in political power, such political movements are to be seen amongst so-called 'indigenous 
peoples' throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America today. That amongst the 'adivasis' of 
South Asia is one of the oldest of them all. 
                                     
4 On the nature of colonial epistemology and the mechanisms of colonial governance see B. Cohn, 'The 
Command of Language and the Language of Command', in R. Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies IV , (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), and 'The Invention of Authority in Victorian India', in E. Hobsbawm and 
T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
5 See J.D.M. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), and D.A. 
Washbrook, 'Law, State and Agrarian society', Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3: 649-721, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
6 For an overview see K.W. Jones, The New Cambridge History of India, III.I: Socio-Religious Reform 
Movements in British India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). An account of the creation 
of a lower-caste identity, influenced by the activity of Christian missionaries in 19th century western 
India, is to be found in R. O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1985). 
7 For the untouchables, or dalits (meaning 'oppressed ones') as they are now known, the principal 
spokesman in the 1920's was B.R. Ambedkar and later on, in the 1930's, Mahatma Gandhi himself, who 
invented the somewhat patronising title of 'Harijans', or 'children of God', for members of this 
community. 
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The concept of the adivasi 
 
According to the political activists who coined the word in the 1930's, the 'adivasis' are 
the original inhabitants of South Asia, and are entitled to special privileges; the bulk of the 
population today are described as 'Indo-Aryan' and are therefore considered as alien 
interlopers by adivasi activists . 
 
The term Indo-Aryan itself derives from the popular (though now contentious) belief that 
the Indian civilization as we know it began only after the invasion of Aryan peoples from 
the north, some time around the second millenium B.C. 8 It was the Aryans, supposedly, 
who originated the Hindu religion, and accordingly in Brahminic ideology the adivasis, 
although having a special status, are often associated with the untouchables or harijans, 
amongst the lowliest section of society.9 In the modern mind the two are also constructed 
in a similar fashion, in that both are regarded as 'backward communities', educationally, 
economically and socially, and because of this they have been made the beneficiaries of 
special legislation aimed at raising their status within the society of independent India. 
 
So committed were the founders of modern India to the 'upliftment' of the adivasis that 
they are specifically mentioned in the constitution, which singles out the so-called 
'scheduled' castes and tribes as in need of special regard and consideration because of their 
traditionally low status within Indian society. Accordingly, the government has since 1951 
instituted a whole series of schemes including, most controversially, the reservation of 
posts in the government and universities for members of these communities in order to 
improve their position. In many cases, however, it is arguable that these attempts at 
positive discrimination (as with most 'instrumental' efforts at social engineering) have not 
solved but merely aggravated the problem of caste prejudice within Indian society, the 
policy having recently provoked a ferocious backlash amongst higher caste groups in 
Indian society and the revival of militant Hindu chauvinist political parties such as the 
Shiv Sena, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Bharatiya Janata Party.  
 
These failures of reservation ought to have been no surprise, given the very flimsy 
rationale on which the policy was based. In particular, the grouping of adivasis and 
harijans together for the purposes of legislation as 'backward communities', was not only 
                                     
8 A contestation of this theory may be found in C. Renfrew, Archaeology and Language: the puzzle of 
Indo-European origins, (London: Penguin, 1987). The idea originated in the writings of the eighteenth 
century Indologist, Sir Willliam Jones, see J. Leopold, 'The Aryan theory of race', Indian Economic & 
Social History Review [IESHR], 7, 2: 271-297, (Delhi: Sage, 1970). 
9 The idea of a 'pre-Aryan' golden age formed a basis for the rejection of caste amongst low-caste 
Hindus, as well as amongst the so-called adivasis. For the former, see R. O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and 
Ideology, chs. 8 and 9. 
5 
 
 
anachronistic, but also historically inaccurate. For example, it can easily be shown that 
many groups within Indian society are highly economically disadvantaged, although 
neither adivasi or harijan. Equally, it is the case that many adivasis and harijans have 
either acquired, or have always had a high status and economic security (it being largely 
these elite sections amongst the scheduled groups that have monopolised many of the 
benefits conferred by discriminatory legislation). 
 
In fact many of the so-called 'adivasis' were originally Hindus, and became adivasis either 
because of a decline in their economic position in society, or because, more recently, it 
has actually been to their advantage to call themselves 'adivasis'. A consequence has been 
that since the introduction of the policy of reservation, the number of adivasis in India as a 
proportion of the total population has actually increased from 5.3 % in 1951 to 7.3 % in 
1971, a reverse of the steady trend of declining numbers in the pre-independence period. 
This phenomenon suggests very clearly that the category of the 'adivasi' or tribal, like so 
many social categories within Indian society, is a highly variable one, defined by 
associations of status and by economic factors that can change considerably over time. 
 
The term 'tribal' has indeed been coined at times to describe anyone who practices slash 
and burn cultivation or hunting and gathering, regardless of their culture or for how long 
they have been doing this. A very good example of this are the Badaga, inhabitants  of the 
Nilgiri Hills, described by the anthropologist Paul Hockings, who were regarded for a 
long time as 'tribals' for their practice of slash burn, although they were originally settled 
peasant cultivators of the Mysore plain until they were driven into the hills by warfare 
some time in the sixteenth century.10 At the same time, whilst economics can play a part 
in defining a community, many settled farmers still call themselves 'adivasis', whilst there 
are many hunter-gatherers and slash and burn agriculturists in India today who call 
themselves 'Hindu'. From this we may conclude that 'adivasi' communities cannot be 
easily distinguished from Hindu peasant communities by their way of life. But then 
neither is it easy to describe the 'adivasis' by their religion, since Hinduism itself is so 
highly eclectic. Adivasis are often described simply as 'animists', but this does little justice 
to their religious beliefs, which can often be highly complex. Many supposedly Hindu 
gods, such as Kali (in Bengal) or the supposed incarnation of Vishnu at Jagannath in Puri, 
were also in fact originally tribal Gods, and are still regarded as such by many today. 
Discussions with a Brahmin pundit in Benares might give one the impression that 
Hinduism is a religion with coherent customs and rituals established over many centuries, 
about which the devout are dutiful and precise in their observance (an impression received 
                                     
10  Paul Hockings, Ancient Hindu Refugees: Badaga social history, 1550-1975, (The Hague: Mouton, 
1980); W. Ross King, The Aboriginal Tribes of the Nilgiri Hills, (London: Longmans, 1870). 
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by many early British scholars of Hinduism), but the reality as one sees it on the margins 
of Indian society is one of eclecticism, change, and frequent borrowings which makes it 
extremely difficult to be certain where one religion ends and another begins.11 
 
In this respect Indian religions are like Indian languages with the boundaries of one 
frequently merging into another. The main source of consistency in both respects, indeed 
often the only source of consistency, is politics. More specifically, political power, 
manifest in the ability of the State, or one ruler or another, to insist on a particular 
language or a particular religion being the normative language or religion within the 
boundaries of a certain territory. This can be seen very clearly if one examines the history 
of particular 'adivasi' kingdoms, such as the central Indian kingdom of Bastar, or even 
simply by looking at modern South Asia, which has been fiercely divided over what 
language should be the language of government, or how the boundaries of states and 
nations should be drawn.12 
 
In the state of Bastar the lingua franca, amongst all the 'adivasi' groups, was halbi, not 
because this was the most widely spoken, nor even because it was a local adivasi dialect, 
but simply because this was the language used by the bodyguard hired by the Raja or king 
of Bastar, who were a group of low caste Hindus - the Halbas. Likewise, the state religion 
involved the worship of the devi goddess Danteshwari at her shrine in Dantewada, to 
which human sacrifices were allegedly made. The Raja could not remain king unless he 
protected and supported this shrine, whilst at the same time the adivasis respected him 
because he was himself supposedly an earthly incarnation of the goddess (whose image 
was in the shrine) - a neat conundrum which legitimised all religious and political 
practices within the state. 
 
Bastar might be regarded as exceptional in its political and religious rituals, given that the 
ruling dynasty was originally Hindu. Nonetheless the Hinduism of the ruling family was 
criss-crossed with tribal ritual in order to render it acceptable to the population, whilst 
Hindu ideas were similarly added to local religious customs. The result was that whilst the 
Raja viewed the devi at Dantewada as an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu and his 
subjects as members of the army of the mythical monkey-god Hanuman, the adivasis 
regarded their Raja as an an incarnation of the Earth goddess Tallur Mattee, who could be 
propitiated only by offerings of animal and human blood. This is not as bizarre as it may 
seem. Accommodations and a multiplicity of symbols and meanings in religious ritual are 
                                     
11  To argue so is not 'orientalist', as the same can be said of early western Christian society as well. 
12 This is a phenomenon that is by no means exclusive to South Asia. Examples of similarly constructed 
identities found elswhere in the world are given in Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communties: 
reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, (London: Verso, 1983). 
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usual in South Asia. At the same time, it may be added that the political arrangement in 
Bastar, although a product of conquest, was by no means uncommon.13 In this particular 
kingdom, by necessity, religion was defined by politics and politics in turn by religion, in 
such a way that neither could be described as innate or essential. The same can also be 
said for the category of 'the adivasi'. 
 
The adivasis as a 'backward community' 
 
Before continuing with the very elusive problem of defining the adivasi, it is necessary to 
go back to the idea of the 'adivasis' and harijans both being 'backward communities', 
which is an important part of modern thinking on the subject. The term 'backward 
community' originated with British legislation which set up the earliest forms of quasi-
representative government in India in the 1920's. Beginning with the Government of India 
Act of 1918, these early concessions by the British to Nationalist opinion in India allowed 
elected representatives to sit in provincial legislative assemblies which had the power to 
make laws in certain areas. These assemblies were also crowded with officials and other 
European nominees, supposedly on the justification that certain communities from certain 
'scheduled areas' were either too backward or oppressed to be able to properly exercise a 
vote, and their representatives had therefore to be appointed by the administration (a 
policy frequently resorted to in central India). 
 
It was for the same reason that separate seats were also established for different religious 
communities. By asserting that they could never co-operate the British made the 
conditions for their co-operation impossible. This was all part of what Indian nationalists 
called the British policy of 'divide and rule', and it was by using the same arguments and 
by appointing a large number of officials to represent the interests of minorities that the 
British were able to justify retaining a right of veto over nearly all the affairs of 
government. 
 
Despite its roots in the political opportunism of a colonial regime, the view that 'adivasis' 
were somehow 'backward', and unable to represent themselves, has nonetheless stuck to 
this day, probably because the idea has been opportune and persuasive to more than a few. 
Indeed it is arguable that colonial perceptions and policies were not entirely invented de 
novo, but were an extension in some cases of Brahminical prejudices.12  More 
                                     
13 The impact of colonialism, the nature of political and religious practice in Bastar, and its implications 
for the understanding of Hindu Kingship and of the relations between Caste and Tribe elsewhere in India, 
I have addressed in two as yet unpublished papers: ' "The invention of perdition": human sacrifice and 
British relations with the Indian kingdom of Bastar in the 19th century' and 'Dasehra and revolt: problems 
of legitimacy in 20th century Bastar', presented at the Centre d'Études de l'Inde et de l'Asie du Sud in the 
Maison des Sciences de l'Homme in Paris, April 1992. 
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importantly, since poverty was taken as a mark of 'backwardness', colonial 
anthropologists could readily find evidence of both, since by the time they were writing 
'adivasi' societies were commonly in a state of crisis. 
 
The economic difficulties for many of the so-called 'adivasi' communities in fact began in 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when the introduction of British conceptions 
of property rights and a European legal system deprived them of vast areas of land. The 
stereotype thus soon developed of the 'adivasi', like it did of the American Indian, as an 
uneducated, landless and poverty-stricken indigent. In reality, however, the majority of 
adivasis lived comfortable lives, at least until the colonial period, having control over 
large areas of land, having armies, an aristocracy, tax collection and judicial systems of 
one sort or another, and often enjoying lucrative trading relations with merchants (such as 
the Banjaras) and Hindu cultivators in the plains. Examples include the Ahom kingdom, 
which flourished in the north-east of India between the thirteenth and late eighteenth 
centuries, which had armies and a sophisticated irrigation system.14 And in central India 
there were numerous 'adivasi' kingdoms which survived, in some cases, from medieval 
times right up until the nineteenth century. 
 
Amongst the adivasi kingdoms of central India was that of Garha-Mandla, in the area of 
modern Jubbulpore and Mandla, which withstood numerous invasions from the north, 
being finally defeated by the Mughals in the mid sixteenth century after a battle in which 
the Queen, Durgavati, commanded an army purportedly including several hundred 
elephants. The account of this army was probably exaggerated since it derives from the 
Ain-i-akbari, the chronicles of the emperor Akbar, which (in common with other Mughal 
sources) tends to enlarge the opposing odds and hence the scale of the Emperor's victories 
(it is also unlikely that elephants were in any case of very great military use in the 
highlands of central India). But although there may not have been any war elephants, 
there were certainly large fortresses and defensive walls, constructed by the adivasis out 
of stone, and the remains of these can be seen today. Another 'adivasi' leader from central 
India, Bukht Buloond, also performed creditably in battles in the mid seventeenth century 
with the Emperor Aurangzeb, who eventually signed a treaty with him, accepting his 
conversion to Islam, rather than continue with the struggle. He too has left forts and other 
ruins to commemorate his rule.15 
                                     
14 Surajit Sinha (ed.), Tribal Polities and State Systems in Pre-colonial Eastern and North Eastern 
India, (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi, 1987) 
15 The ruins of these forts today are highly inaccessible, but photographs of them may be found in 
nineteenth century gazetteers, for example that for the Chhindwara district, published in 1867, which 
illustrates the ruins of Deogurh fort, to be found near the modern village of Deogarh. The keep of the 
Garha fortress, known as the Madan Mahal, also still crowns the range of hills along the foot of which 
the town of Jabalpur is built. 
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The 'adivasi' in history 
 
The existence in the recent past of organised and powerful adivasi kingdoms within India 
should be no great surprise, since so-called 'tribal groups' have been important in the 
history of both Europe and Asia since ancient times. There are, indeed, numerous ruling 
dynasties which originated as invading tribal groups, such as the Manchu Chi'ing dynasty 
(which ruled China up until the beginning of this century), or the Khans in Persia. In India 
too, many of the dominant castes, such as the Jats of north India, or the Marathas of 
western India, were originally tribal groupings, and these tribal communities cut across 
caste associations as well as pre-dating them in many cases.16 The problem is that most 
were non-literate cultures which, unlike the Mughals for example, have left no written 
records to tell us of their achievements - a problem similar to that faced by students of the 
predominantly oral civilizations of pre-modern Africa, Scandinavia and North America. 
The temptation has always existed therefore to regard these communities as 'backward', 
and to view them as in some way previous rather than parallel to our own or other 
contemporaneous civilizations. Either that, or historians have completely ignored them. 
 
This temptation was particularly strong to European writers in the nineteenth century who 
were imbued with a sense of racial and cultural superiority and who were enthusiasts for 
the new theory of evolution, which seemed  to explain the whole of the natural world to 
them and to justify their own pre-eminence.17 That tribal peoples might be considered as 
evolutionary antecedents, as inferior examples of humanity, was confirmed by the ease 
with they were conquered. And the impression that they were somehow inferior or 
previous human specimens, legitimised the whole imperial enterprise, making conquest 
not merely a right of the fittest, but a duty, if the world was to be civilized and the 
evolution of man advanced.18 
 
                                     
16 The classic text on this is R.G. Fox, Kin, Clan, Raja and Rule: state-hinterland relations in pre-
industrial India, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971). See also Sunita Zaid, 'The 
Mughal State and tribes in seventeenth century Sind', IESHR, 26, 3: 343-362, (Delhi: Sage, 1989), and 
Chetan Singh, 'Conformity and conflict: tribes in the "agrarian system" of Mughal India', IESHR, 25, 3: 
319-340, (Delhi: Sage,1988). 
17 Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, (New York: Pelican, 1984); G. Huizer and B. 
Mannheim (eds.), The Politics of Anthropology: from colonialism and sexism toward a view from below, 
(Mouton, The Hague: 1979). For examples see M.D. Biddis (ed.), Images of Race, (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1979). 
18 A classic of this school is J. Peggs, India's Cries to British Humanity: an historical account of Suttee, 
Infanticide, Ghat Murders and Slavery in India, 3rd edition (London: Simpkin & Marshall, 1832). This 
influential book, which brought the term 'juggernaut' among other things into the English language, was 
originally published as a series of pamphlets by the Coventry Society for the Suppression of Human 
Sacrifice in India. 
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These ideas persisted for a long time, despite their evident absurdity, and despite 
contestation by authors such as Thomas Huxley, mainly because they were very 
convenient. Apart from justifiying a European sense of superiority, the taxonomy of race 
and cultures also made the management of the imperial territories very much easier. In the 
search for collaborators in imperial rule, or culprits for the failures of the colonial 
government, the new 'science' of anthropology in particular was of enormous importance 
as it seemed to enable entire sections of society to be stigmatised or encouraged without 
one ever having to know in detail exactly who they were. In this way theories about 
supposedly 'criminal' tribes and so-called 'martial' races (such as the Sikhs) facilitated the 
understanding and the administration of vast territories which might otherwise have 
appeared utterly strange, chaotic and threatening.19 
 
These ideas were then used as a basis for legislation such as the Criminal Tribes Act of 
1871, which subjected to restrictions whole sections of the Indian population who were 
judged to be a threat to peace and order.20 Many of the problems of the people who call 
themselves 'adivasi' therefore originate from their having become just such an object of 
colonial policy. In this context, I have already mentioned the policy of 'divide and rule', 
but many of the tribal communities were also seriously affected by the range of policies 
adopted in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries aimed at settling the 
countryside in the wake of the colonial conquest.21 By this is meant the new revenue 
systems, the law courts, and the Western legal concepts in the administration of land 
rights which were introduced at the beginning of the colonial period. Drawn as they were 
from European experience, where hunting and gathering, pastoral and other shifting forms 
of agricultural economy had long since been marginalised or extinguished, these concepts 
and institutions had the effect in India of destroying adivasi economic systems almost 
overnight. 
 
                                     
19 See A. Kirk-Greene, ' "Damnosa Hereditas": ethnic ranking and the martial races imperative in 
Africa', Ethnic & Racial Studies, 3, 4: 393-414, (London, 1980). Also Talal Asad (ed.), Anthropology 
and the Colonial Encounter, (London: Ithaca, 1973); G.W. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, (London: 
Macmillan, 1987); C. Fyfe, 'Race, empire and the historians', Race & Class, 33,4: 15-30, (London: 
Institute of Race Relations, 1992). 
20 S. Nigam, 'Disciplining and policing the "criminals by birth", parts 1 & 2', IESHR, 27, 2 & 3: 131-165 
& 257-288, (Delhi: Sage, 1990); E.J. Gunthorpe, Notes on Criminal Tribes Residing in or Frequenting 
the Bombay Presidency, Berar and the Central Provinces, (Bombay: Govt. Press, 1882); J. Kennedy, The 
Criminal Classes of India, (Delhi, 1907, reprinted by Mittal Publications, 1985); Augustus Somerville, 
Crime and Religious Beliefs in India, (Calcutta: The Criminologist, 1929). What was convenient in India 
was also convenient in Africa, with the policy of 'indirect rule', amongst other things, producing very 
similar results: see L. Vail (ed.), The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa, (London: James Currey, 
1989) and T. Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger, The 
Invention of Tradition. 
21 See C.A. Bayly, The New Cambridge History of India, II.I: Indian society and the Making of the 
British Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1988), ch. 5. 
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Sometimes this was done deliberately out of a desire to encourage settled systems of 
agriculture which could more easily be taxed. Often, however, adivasis were thrown off 
their land and prevented from pursuing their traditional occupations simply through 
ignorance of their importance within the Indian economy. As a consequence, whole 
communities of adivasis were turned into migrants, sometimes almost overnight, being 
forced to roam the countryside in search of work, many of them ending in employment in 
the newly-established tea plantations in Assam, the coal mines, jute mills and steel 
factories of Bengal, or in far off destinations such as the sugar plantations of Jamaica, 
Mauritius and Fiji - these distant overseas destinations absorbing some two million of the 
Indian population between 1860 and 1920 (excluding the numbers which migrated to 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka).22 
 
A common misconception held by colonial administrators was that, being 'primitive' 
societies the activities of the 'adivasis' were of little value, and unrelated to those of the 
settled tax-paying cultivators of the plains. However, the truth of the matter was that many 
so-called 'tribals', such as the Gonds of Deogurh in central India, had previously been 
plainsmen themselves, only later on being driven into the hills by warfare and the growing 
numbers of Hindu settlers. And even in the early nineteenth century the adivasis of central 
India had often continued to produce a range of important and valuable products upon 
which the plains people depended. These included iron ploughshares, made and sold to 
the peasants of the plains by a tribe called the Agaria.23 The adivasis also produced and 
sold axeheads, myrabolams (dyes), wood, mahua (an alcoholic drink), cattle, silk, spices 
and tendu leaves (from which bidis, an Indian type of cigarette, were and continue to be 
made). These they exchanged for salt and grain which they obtained either directly from 
adjacent peasant communities, or by trading with the Banjaras, a trading group, whose 
caravans traversed the length and breadth of India in the days before the advent of 
railways. 
 
Adivasi areas were vital for Banjaras because of the grazing they provided (as well being 
a source of young bullocks) and central India was traversed by two such Banjara routes, 
one beginning in Hyderabad and heading north through Burhanpur, and the other coming 
from the eastern coast in Orissa and passing up north though Garha-Mandla. This second 
caravan began loaded with salt, which the Banjaras then traded for grain, bullocks, raw 
silk, iron etc. in the adivasi areas before heading on to Mirzapur in the north of India. 
Even as late as the 1820's this trade was substantial, employing as many as 100,000 pack-
                                     
22 C. Bates & M. Carter, 'Tribal migration in India and beyond', in G. Prakash (ed.), The World of the 
Rural Labourer in Colonial India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
23 V. Elwin, The Agaria, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1942). 
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bullocks.24 The impact of colonial policies was such, however, that this this trade had 
been completely extinguished by the 1860's, and the once prosperous Banjaras (who had 
helped supply the armies of the British during their wars with the Marathas and other 
Hindu princes), had by the end of the nineteenth century been reduced from their earlier 
position socially and economically on the boundaries between 'caste' and 'adivasi' society 
to the status of a wholly 'criminal tribe', known only for their 'vagrancy' and their 
propensity for thieving.25 
 
The experience of the Banjaras mirrored that of many other 'adivasi' communities, and it 
is in this recent experience of impoverishment, and this only, that lies the conception of 
many of these communities as 'backward'. But even if backward, or economically 
'irrelevant' as far as the British were concerned within the pattern of the colonial economy, 
the importance of 'adivasi' communities politically and socially continued well into the 
present century. 
 
Although regarded by some British scholars as inferior to caste Hindus, the status of 
'adivasis' in practice most often paralleled that of the Hindus, being regarded by most not 
so much as inferior as simply outside of the caste system. Nearly every Hindu village in 
central and northern India in fact depended (and still does) on locally resident adivasis, 
such as the Pardhans in Madhya Pradesh, to perform magic rites at certain times of the 
year and at marriage ceremonies, and who were also asked to drive out disease or the 
threat of poor crops.26 In areas where they accounted for a large proportion of the 
population, adivasis furthermore often wielded considerable ritual and political power, 
being involved in the investiture of various kings and rulers throughout central India and 
Rajasthan. 
 
Where such Hindu-tribal associations were broken, as in the nineteenth century 
Himalayan kingdom of Garwhal, the Raja was often no longer able to maintain his 
authority, or his kingdom.27 Other, originally Hindu Rajas, sometimes had to adopt 
adivasi religions and forms of government completely in order to rule their territories. 
                                     
24 J.T. Blunt, 'Narrative of a route from Chinargur to Yentragoodum...1795', in Early European 
Travellers in the Nagpur Territories, (Nagpur: Govt. Press, 1930). A more detailed discussion of this 
trade may be found in C. Bates, 'Tribalism, dependency and the sub-regional dynamics of economic 
change in central India,' in C.J. Dewey (ed.), The State and the Market: studies in the economic and 
social history of the third world, (Riverdale, U.S.A.: 1987). 
25 S. Nigam, op. cit.  M. Radhakrishna, 'The criminal tribes act in Madras Presidency: implications for 
itinerant trading communities', IESHR, 26, 3: 269-296, (Delhi: Sage, 1989). 
26 Samrau Hivale, The Pardhans of the Upper Narbada Valley, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 
1946) 
27 J.-C. Galey, 'Reconsidering Kingship in India: an ethnological perspective', in J.-C. Galey (ed.), 
Kingship and the Kings, (New York, Harwood Academic publishers, 1989). The status of the gaddi (or 
throne) in general and in the kingdom of Garhwal is discussed on pp. 166-185. 
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From this we may conclude that historians ought not think of 'Adivasi' and 'Hindu' 
kingdoms as being entirely distinct in form and structure. All too often however adivasi 
kingdoms are thought of as static and backward societies outside of the mainstream of 
Indian culture. That this is not so I believe to be very clearly illustrated by the case of the 
kingdom of Bastar - which was itself a relatively recent creation, having been founded by 
migrants, the family of Annam Deo, who were forced to move northwards into the 
highlands of central India in the early fourteenth century following the Muslim invasion 
of their homeland at Warangal in Andhra Pradesh. 
 
Looking at 'tribal history' more generally some historians, such as Christopher Bayly, 
have argued that 'adivasis' were involved not only in the downfall of kingdoms, but of 
whole empires, the Muslim empires of the Ottomans and Safavids, as well as the Mughals 
falling prey to tribal incursions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries during the 
periods of their decline.28 And rebellious tribesmen caused as much trouble for the British 
as they did for their Mughal predecessors. Throughout central India in the 1820's they had 
to battle against hordes of raiding horsemen, probably unemployed Afghani tribal 
mercenaries (Rohillas), known to the British as 'Pindaris', and they also had to deal with 
widespread insurrections amongst the Gonds, Bhils and Bundela communities. 
 
In recent research I have found large numbers of 'adivasis' to have been involved in 
fighting during the great uprising of 1857, known as the 'Indian Mutiny', although they 
feature little in conventional accounts.29 Some areas and some tribal communities, in fact, 
were never effectively pacified, from which one might conclude that the pax britannica in 
India was something of a myth. There were, for example, a total of more than twenty 
uprisings in Assam between 1826 and 1932 (when the last revolt of the Nagas was put 
down). There were also a succession of uprisings by the Mal Paharias of Bihar, and by the 
Lushais and Daflas of Assam, as well as spectacular insurrections by the Hos of 
Singhbum, and the Khonds of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. 
 
Those who retained some land and some independence usually put up the stiffest 
resistance, and thus during the Santhal hool or insurrection in Bihar in central India in 
1855, fighting continued for many months and some 10,000 adivasis were killed in British 
                                     
28 C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: the British empire and the world, 1780-1830, (London: Longman, 
1989); M. Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-1748, 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
29 See also D. Baker, 'Colonial beginnings and the Indian response: the revolts of 1857-58 in Madhya 
Pradesh', Modern Asian Studies, 25, 3: 511-543, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). It is 
my belief that unemployed mercenaries and nomadic and newly landless tribesmen were also an 
important part of the bandit problem in central India, which became known from the 1830's onwards as 
the criminal and religious conspiracy of Thuggee. 
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reprisals before the movement was effectively suppressed: a fateful struggle which turned 
the Santhal districts into one of the biggest sources of migrant labour in the second half of 
the nineteenth century.30 Other areas such as the Gudem-Rampa region of Andhra 
Pradesh were a constant source of unrest throughout the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth centuries, the most important and recent of these uprisings being in the 
Telengana region: a communist-led struggle which lasted from 1946 to 1951, covering an 
area of 16,000 square miles, and which eventually had to be put down by the army of 
independent India.31 
 
It was in these struggles against the colonial government and against the Hindu settlers 
and money-lenders that came in their wake, that many of the tribal communities for the 
first time began to forge a common identity, an identity which often conflicted with the 
ideals of Indian Nationalism being developed by Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress party 
in the 1920's and '30's.32 
 
During the independence movement itself, the Congress seriously attempted to co-opt 
many adivasi movements, but failing to understand what they were about they were 
usually unsuccessful, and adivasi agitations against the colonial authorities remained 
largely beyond their control.33 Sometimes indeed they were as much opposed to 
Congressmen as they were to the British: examples include the Devi movement in Gujarat 
in the 1920's, which involved the boycott of Parsi liquor-dealers and moneylenders who 
were supporters of the Congress, and an agitation that took place in the central Indian 
zamindari of Dondi-Lohara over the loss of forest rights, which began in 1927 and 
continued until the early 1950's and which was actively opposed by the Congress 
government when it was in power in the province between 1937 and 1939.34 
 
                                     
30 An account of this insurrection is given in Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency 
in Colonial India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
31 D. Arnold, 'Rebellious Hill-men: the Gudem-Rampa risings, 1839-1924', in R. Guha (ed.), Subaltern 
Studies 1, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982); M. Atlury, 'Alluri Sitarama Raju and the Manyam 
rebellion of 1922-24', Social Scientist, 131: 1-33, (Delhi, 1984); P. Sundarayya, Telengana People's 
Armed Struggle, 1946-1951, (Delhi: National Book Centre, 1985). 
32 An example of the invention of a form of an 'adivasi identity' in the Chittagong Hill tracts, that began 
long before the advent of the anti-colonial movement in India and was largely unaffected by it, is given 
in W. Van Schendel, 'The invention of the "Jummas": state formation and ethnicity in Southeastern 
Bangladesh', Modern Asian Studies, 26, 1: 95-128, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See 
also Bain Attwood, The Making of the Aborigines, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989), an account of the 
invention of an 'aboriginal' identity amongst the indigenous peoples of southern Australia. 
33 For a summary of the issues involved here see S. Sarkar, 'Popular' Movements and 'Middle Class' 
Leadership in Late Colonial India: perspectives & problems of a 'history from below', (Calcutta: Centre 
for Social Studies, 1983). 
34 D. Hardiman, The Devi Movement: adivasi assertion in western India, (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press,1987). My own research into Dondi Lohara will be published in the near future. 
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The 'adivasis' today  
 
From the above it should be apparent that relations between the Congress party, which 
brought India to independence, and the 'adivasis', have always been somewhat fraught. 
Since independence, the policy of the Indian government has been a curious mixture of 
inversions and reproductions of the earlier policies of the British. Initially, although 
maybe agreeing with the British that the 'adivasis' were still too 'backward' to be allowed 
responsible government, they rejected altogether the idea that they ought be protected in 
special reservations. Sardar Patel, the nationalist leader and first home minister of the 
government of Independent India, whilst answering a question in Parliament by Jaipal 
Singh, the President of the Adivasi Mahasabha (an important political voice for the 
adivasis by the 1950's), thus described the government's policy as one of '...endeavouring 
to bring the tribal people up to the level of Mr. Jaipal Singh and not keep them as tribes, 
so that 10 years hence...the word "tribes" may be removed altogether when they should 
have come up to our level.'35 As a consequence, although benefiting from the measures of 
positive discrimination introduced to promote the employment of harijans and other 
'backward communities' in the government service, the adivasis lost much of the 
protection, such as it was, that had been given to what remained of their land in the later 
years of colonial rule. Inevitably, a wholesale destruction of forests in the adivasi areas 
ensued, with a million Biharis migrating into and settling in the adivasi areas of 
Chotanagpur in central India, for example, between 1951 and 1971. This deprived 
thousands of 'adivasis' of their land: landlessness amongst the adivasis as a whole 
increasing from 20% to 33% in the ten years between 1961 and 1971 alone.36 
 
Belatedly recognising the inadequacies of its policy the Government of India has 
established tribal development blocks, 'social forestry programmes', and special funds to 
assist these areas, and has re-introduced certain restrictions on the sale of tribal lands. This 
reversal has been ineffective however, and in both Chotanagpur and Bastar in the 1970's 
adivasi agitators have blocked government forestry programmes in protest at the lack of 
attention that has been paid to their needs and the sacrifice of 'adivasi' lands to 
commercial interests.37  
 
Resentment amongst adivasi communities has also encouraged a succession of protest 
movements, including the Jharkhand agitation - calling for a separate 'adivasi' state in 
                                     
35 G.S. Ghurye, The Scheduled Tribes of India, p. 349. 
36 S.N. Dubey & R. Murdia, Land Alienation and Restoration in Tribal Communities in India, (Bombay: 
Himalaya, 1977); K.S. Singh, Economies of the Tribes and Their Transformation, (Delhi: Concept, 
1982), p. xii. 
37 R.S. Anderson & Walter Huber, The Hour of the Fox: tropical forests, the World Bank, and 
indigenous people in central India, (Delhi: Vistar, 1988). 
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central India, the Chipko movement - a movement of peasants and tribals in the 
Himalayas who have been campaigning for many years against the degradation of the 
forests on which they depend for a livelihood, and the revolutionary Naxalite movement - 
which began as student-led communist insurrection in Bengal in the late 1960's and early 
'70's, and which, following its suppression by the government of India, has subsequently 
become established in several of the more backward areas in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and 
Andhra Pradesh.38 
 
Most recently furious controversy has blown up over the issue of reservations, which have 
encouraged a backlash amongst high caste Hindus resulting in widespread rioting (a 
virtual caste war) throughout the north of India, and the self-immolation of some fifty 
high school and university students. This problem had been escalating since 1981, but was 
brought to a head in 1990 by the proposal of the government of Mr. V.P. Singh to extend 
the quotas of government posts and university places allowed to members of the 
'backward communities'.39 Together with the scheduled castes, the adivasis are the main 
victims of the violence which has erupted. Like the discrimination that reservation is 
supposed to deal with, one therefore cannot help but think that the 'adivasis' are as much 
victims of the solution as of the problem to begin with. 
 
For politicians a way out of this impasse will probably lie in new policies which end the 
attempt to use counter-caste prejudice to deal with caste prejudice, and which see the 
adoption of primarily economic criterian to assist the advancement of underprivileged 
communities. For historians and anthropologists the dilemmas are, in intellectual terms, 
perhaps more acute. In recent times it is arguable that the adivasis have taken on many of 
the characteristics of a super-exploited economic class - their marginalisation in the 
nineteenth century having turned them into a reserve of cheap labour and one of India's 
most important migratory groups - a phenomenon well illustrated by the annual migration 
of some 250,000 Biharis from the east of India to the Punjab in the west, where they are 
employed as low-paid agricultural labourers at harvest time.40 But this is clearly a feature 
of 'adivasi' culture in decline and is not a fundamental characteristic of these societies. 
                                     
38 N. Sengupta (ed.), Fourth World Dynamics: Jharkhand, (Delhi: Authors Guild, 1982); S. Corbridge, 
'The ideology of tribal economy and society: politics in the Jharkhand, 1950-1980', Modern Asian 
Studies, 22, 1: 1-42, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Thomas Weber, Hugging the 
Trees: the story of the Chipko Movement, (Delhi: Viking, 1985); Rabindra Ray, The Naxalites and their 
Ideology, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988); Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: ecological 
change and peasant resistance in the Himalaya, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
39 Asghar Ali Engineer, The Mandal Commission Controversy, (Delhi: Ajanta, 1991). 
40.A.S. Oberai and H.K. Manmohan Singh, Causes and Consequences of Internal Migration: a study in 
the Indian Punjab, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 229. For a case study of adivasi migrant 
labour in western India see Jan Breman, Of Peasants, Migrants and Paupers: rural labour circulation 
and capitalist production in West India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
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From a broader perspective one might argue that the search for an 'essential' adivasi 
culture and society is itself an illusion, and that both the concept and its object have 
always been a political construct. Rather than ask 'who were the adivasis' therefore, it 
might be better to ask 'who wants to define them', since the definition of original or 
anterior inhabitants is usually a preliminary to the establishment of claims to political or 
economic power or (alternatively) reflects the power of an existing elite, exerting its 
cultural hegemony. 
 
Claims of this sort perhaps reveal more about the structure of Indian politics and society 
than anything else. Whilst governments have viewed them as economic 'outlaws' and have 
treated them as such, most of our definitions of the 'tribal' in India (as elsewhere) are 
derived from the view-point of non-tribals, and they describe the 'adivasis' of India in 
largely negative terms as what is different or 'other than' the mainstream of Indian society. 
Unlike in African anthropology where the concept has been given real meaning (if only 
through it's persistent use in practice), in India the concept of 'the tribal' has been largely a 
dustbin category into which is thrown all that is unorthodox and non-Hindu. Many 
anthropologists have also regarded the history of 'adivasi' societies as a unilineal process, 
depicting the adivasis as merely an early stage in the process of 'modernisation', as spin-
offs from the formation of great states and empires, or as the inevitable victims of 
Hinduisation (as argued by Srinivas and N.K. Bose)41 - a view partly conditioned by 
modern anthropology's experience of adivasis, who are normally encountered at the stage 
when their political authority has vanished and their economies are all but extinct.  
 
These definitions have found their apotheosis in the writings, for example, of Morton 
Fried, who argued that tribals may only be defined as peoples on the margin of settled 
kingdoms and empires, and in the earlier writings of Marshall Sahlins, who described 
'tribal societies' as merely an initial phase in the onward march of the conquest of nature 
by humankind.42 Generally it may be said that the history of 'adivasi' peoples has been 
neglected and at best has been treated only partially by competing academic disciplines. 
On the one hand, the existence of ancient 'adivasi' kingdoms is acknowledged and 
described by many Indologists, but this knowledge is seen as having no connection with 
the existence of modern nation states. On the other hand anthropologists have developed 
the concept of 'the tribe' as an analytical category used to describe kinship patterns in pre-
                                     
41 M.N. Srinivas, The Dominant Caste and other essays, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987); N.K. 
Bose, 'The Hindu mode of tribal absorbtion' in Cultural Anthropology and Other Essays, (Calcutta: 
Indian associated publishers, 1953), and The Structure of Hindu Society, (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1975). 
42 Morton H. Fried, 'On the Concepts of "Tribe" and "Tribal Society" ', Transactions of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 28, 4: 527-540, (New York: 1966); M.D. Sahlins, Tribesmen, (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1968). 
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modern societies. Rarely however are these societies seen to have evolved or survived in 
any substantive form into the present, let alone to have any political or cultural 
significance. Usually they are judged to have been largely supplanted by more modern 
social and economic structures: whatever politics and society that remains is appropriated 
by much wider 'human rights' or eco-political concerns. 
 
In this context it is worth mentioning that in central India there are a great variety of 
'adivasi' groups, but that a large proportion of them have been subsumed by scholars 
under the generic title of 'Gond', a name that is completely alien to the adivasis. In Bastar 
the tribals of the lowlands most often refer to themselves as simply 'Koitur' or 'the people'. 
Further south and east, in Orissa, the generic name given to a variety of adivasi 
communities is simply 'Kond', which means 'low hills' in the language of the Telugu 
speaking peasants of the plains. It requires little imagination to conceive how this 
appellation was invented by early colonial explorers, an appellation that nonetheless 
became widely used by the adivasis, for reasons that are simple enough: problems of 
communication work both ways at once. 
 
Similar problems of translation and communication lie behind the modern epithets of 
'adivasi' and 'indigenous peoples'. Both are terms adopted by tribal peoples in order to 
make themselves understood to the powers that be: the hegemonic classes of the towns, 
cities and states. These identities are adopted more by necessity than by choice, and they 
tell us little about the history of those identified as such. They are an adaptation to 
colonial ideas about castes and tribes, based on an epistemology that resolutely refused 
any understanding of claims to legitimacy and power phrased in terms other than those of 
property and contract. Rather like the often highly inventive vamshavalis (or genealogies) 
used by Hindu kings to establish their claims to a throne, the claims by adivasis to be 'the 
original inhabitants' are used simply as a means of legitimising demands for the redress of 
present-day economic and political inequalities. Such movements of 'indigenous peoples' 
express a desire by subordinate groups to lay claim to their own understanding of the past, 
but the form of this understanding is rooted in the present. The result is fatally flawed. 
Whilst adivasi claims often refer to a past golden age of tribal kingdoms and territories, in 
practice their identity has been forged in a commonality of experience that is very recent 
in origin. It is arguable therefore that the 'adivasis' are not at all the 'original inhabitants' 
but merely the recently dispossessed, and that not only the signifier but what is signified 
by the concept of the 'adivasi' is an invention of colonialism, an essential 'other' in the 
conspectus of modernity. The Independent Commission on International Humanitarian 
Issues (ICIHI) has tried to alleviate doubts by arguing that the Indian adivasis are an 
exceptional case, but by conceiving of 'indigenous peoples' in less romantic and more 
practical terms, it may be possible to avoid the notional dichotomy between 'preservation' 
19 
 
 
and 'assimilation', and to move toward policy options that in the long term are more likely 
to serve the interests of subordinate and marginalsied groups. The first step in this 
direction may be to admit that all Indians are, in one sense, 'adivasis'. 
